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1 This memorandum draws upon research conducted by Northwestern University 
School of Law students: Ronit Arie, Shilpa Avasare, Chrissy Bishai, Jamie Lynn 
Crofts, Federico Cuadra del Carmen, Clare Diegel, Tiffany Eng, Jeanne John, 
Emma Jones, Hannah Jurowicz, Josh Kaiser, Caitlin Kovacs, Lysondra Ludwig, 
Katherine Moskop, Alexius O'Malley, Valerie Petein, Kelli Rucker, Joshua 
Steinman, Raia Stoicheva, Raphael Sznajder, Kari Talbott, Christine Terada, 
Fitsum Tilahun, Kyle Valenti, Kristen Vogel. Professor David Scheffer, the 
moderator of the conference, is deeply grateful to these students for their research 
assistance.  
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I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (INVESTIGATION 
COORDINATOR ALEX WHITING AND DEFENSE COUNSEL RODNEY DIXON) 
General 
During 2010, criticism continued that only Africans have 
been indicted by the ICC so far. Double standards and a new form of 
Western law-driven colonialism of African nations were among the 
complaints.    
How did the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the 
judges counter this criticism?  What non-African situations are 
being actively reviewed by the OTP and what progress was made 
during 2010 in those particular reviews?  (e.g., Colombia, 
Georgia, Palestine, Afghanistan, Honduras, Korea).  Does the 
OTP’s review of the massacre in Guinea and violence in Cote 
D’Ivoire and Nigeria reveal an inescapable reality of having to 
keep the focus on Africa? 
One of the greatest challenges facing the ICC in 2010 was the 
continuing need to apprehend indicted fugitives.  For example, 
indicted Sudan President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Ahmad 
Harun, Ali Kushayb, Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) co-indictees, and Bosco Ntaganda remained at large.  Some 
enjoy the protection of their own government while others enjoy 
virtual sanctuaries on foreign territory.   
What tools has the OTP employed to seek arrest of these 
indictees?  Is there any reason to be optimistic for 2011? 
The OTP issued a draft paper on the preliminary 
examinations a few months ago and has been eliciting comments.  
The paper is interesting on many levels, particularly with its 
attention to admissibility issues, including gravity requirements.   
What can you tell us about the content of the paper; how 
is it intended to guide the work of the OTP in examining 
situations and arriving at decisions on whether to seek 
investigative authority from the Pre-Trial Chamber, and what 
experts have been writing in about it? 
 Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s nine year term in office 
will expire this year.   
Understanding that you are part of the OTP and thus 
suitably reserved on such matters, can you still describe to us 
what is transpiring in terms of selecting his successor?  Are there 
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any openly-declared candidates?   How might his legacy best be 
described? 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
1. In the Katanga/Ngudjolo case, 2010 saw a wide range of 
decisions by the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber decisions on 
victim participation.  The Appeals Chamber, on May 24, 2010, 
found that for victims’ participation in appeals brought under Article 
82(1)(d) of the Rome Statute, four cumulative criteria must be met; 
they also found that such criteria were in fact met.  The fourth 
criterion was that the manner of participation should neither cause 
prejudice to nor be inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a 
fair and impartial trial.   
How does the OTP view such rulings that embrace a 
vigorous victim participation in the case? 
 
2. In the Lubanga case, 2010 was nearly as turbulent as 2008 
when the issue of potentially exculpatory evidence almost dismissed 
the case.  On July 8, 2010, Trial Chamber I ordered a stay in the 
proceedings on grounds that the fair trial of the accused is no longer 
possible due to non-implementation of the Chambers orders by the 
Prosecution to confidentially disclose to the Defense the names and 
other necessary identifying information of a particular witness.  On 
July 15, 2010, the Trial Chamber ordered the release of Lubanga.  
On October 8, 2010, the Appeals Chamber reversed Trial Chamber 
I’s stay; the Trial Chamber had erred by resorting immediately to a 
stay of proceedings without first imposing sanctions under Article 71 
to bring about the Prosecutor’s compliance with its orders.  The stay 
of proceedings was the key element underpinning the decision to 
release Lubanga, so reversing it vitiates the release order.  There was 
no finding that Lubanga was detained for an unreasonable period due 
to the inexcusable delay of the Prosecutor, and it was considered 
inappropriate for the Appeals Chamber to enter findings for the Trial 
Chamber on these points. 
Which priority should prevail—the protection of 
witnesses or expediting the trial proceedings?  How did the 
Lubanga case almost appear to collapse with the ordered release 
of Lubanga, and why was the OTP, to the extreme displeasure of 
the Trial Chamber, so rigid in its protection of a key witness’s 
identity?  Could this crisis in the case have been averted or 
handled differently?   
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Darfur, Sudan 
1. Regarding the indicted fugitives Ahmad Harun & Ali 
Kushayb, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo issued a press release on 
November 6, 2010, highlighting the ICC Judges’ decision of May 
25, 2010, which informed the U.N. Security Council that Sudan was 
not respecting UNSC Resolution 1593, as it had refused to arrest 
Harun and Kushayb.  Moreno-Ocampo described in particular 
Harun’s many activities in Darfur through the years and to the 
present time, including attacks on civilians and managing the crime 
of extermination in the camps for displaced persons, the same people 
whose displacement he had orchestrated.  “He should be arrested 
before he commits new crimes in his new position,” Moreno-
Ocampo said. As recently as January 13, 2011, Harun visited Abyei, 
apparently with the assistance of the U.N. mission in Sudan, which 
attracted strong criticism from Amnesty International.   
How is the OTP continuing its investigation of both 
Harun and Kushayb while they remain at large?  Are Harun’s 
activities highly incriminating such that they might lead to an 
amended indictment in the future?  What is the strategy, if any, 
of the Security Council to secure their surrender to the ICC? 
 
2. In the case of indicted fugitive President Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, 2010 proved to be an eventful year on many 
fronts.  First, on January 28, 2010, the Appeals Chamber found that 
eight victims fulfilled the criteria for participation in an appeal, 
which is abnormal, but the Appeals Chamber concluded that “in light 
of the extraordinary circumstances of the present case, which 
impeded the Victims from approaching the Chamber earlier,” their 
was participation appropriate; the Appeals Chamber allowed them to 
make substantive submissions to the case. Judge Sang-Hyun Song 
dissented, stating, “Victims who did not participate in the underlying 
proceedings have no right to participate in the ensuing appeal.”  
How do you assess the Appeals Chamber’s decision to 
permit the eight victims to participate in the appeals proceeding?  
Is that a role for victims that OTP embraces? 
Second, on February 3, 2010, the Appeals Chamber reversed 
the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 2009 decision on the scope of the 
indictment against Al Bashir.  The Appeals Chamber found that to 
require that the existence of genocidal intent be the only reasonable 
conclusion in order to meet the standard of “reasonable grounds to 
believe” for issuance of an arrest warrant would amount to requiring 
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the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable conclusions and to 
eliminate any reasonable doubt.  Such a standard of proof is too 
demanding at the arrest warrant stage, essentially when requiring the 
Prosecutor to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt before trial.  
Instead, the “reasonable grounds” standard at the warrant stage must 
be distinguished from the “substantial grounds to believe” standard 
at the confirmation stage and the “beyond reasonable doubt” 
standard at trial. 
Why did it take so long for the Appeals Chamber to 
render a relatively simple reversal of the Pre-Trial Chamber on 
the scope of the indictment and the standard of reasonable 
grounds to believe?   
Third, on July 12, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I delivered its 
new decision, issuing charges of genocide for the first time in the 
ICC’s history.  The Chamber agreed that its prior ruling implied that 
there were indeed reasonable grounds to suspect specific genocidal 
intent, and that this was sufficient under the correct standard of proof 
for an arrest warrant.  There were reasonable grounds to believe that 
the attacks on victims of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups were 
made based on the ethnic composition of the villages.  There also 
were reasonable grounds to believe that the attacks took place “in the 
context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against the 
target group or must have had such a nature so as to itself effect, the 
total or partial destruction of the targeted group.”   
The Prosecutor invoked Articles 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c) of the 
Rome Statute.  The Chamber agreed with the Article 6(a) (killing) 
and 6(b) (seriously bodily or mental harm) prongs of genocide.  As 
for 6(c) (deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction), the 
Prosecution argued that the methods of destruction used by Al 
Bashir included the: i) destruction of the group’s means of survival 
in its homeland; ii) systematic displacement from their homes into 
inhospitable terrain where some died as a result of thirst, starvation, 
and disease; iii) usurpation of the land; and iv) denial and hindrance 
of medical and other humanitarian assistance needed to sustain life 
in internally displaced person (IDP) camps.  The Chamber also noted 
the fostering of insecurity among the displaced, the occasional 
contamination of the wells in the attacked towns, and the 
encouragement of other tribes to resettle in the lands previously 
inhabited by the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups.  The Chamber 
found there were reasonable grounds to believe that the subjective 
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elements of genocide (deliberately inflicting on the target group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical 
destruction) were fulfilled.  The Chamber further decided that there 
were reasonable grounds to believe that rape was committed within 
Count 2, namely the Article 6(b) category of serious bodily or 
mental harm.  But there is no mention of rape in the Chamber’s 
decision regarding Count 3, namely the Article 6(c) category of 
deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about 
physical destruction.   
How important was the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s July 12th 
decision, which expanded the indictment against Al Bashir to 
include genocide?  Was this a “game changer” for the 
Prosecution’s case against Al Bashir and did it lead to significant 
aftershocks in the region and in Al Bashir’s conduct (for better 
or worse)?  Did it open up new avenues of investigation for the 
OTP against Al Bashir?  The PTC’s approval of 6(a), 6(b), and 
6(c) categories of genocide for the indictment must have 
encouraged the Prosecutor.  However, was he disappointed that 
the charge of rape as genocide was seemingly not adopted by the 
PTC for an Article 6(c) charge?  Is there an opening for rape as 
genocide under “torture” regarding Count 3 (Art. 6(c)) as 
discussed in paragraph 37 of the Second Decision?  Has the 
PTC’s second request for cooperation in making the arrest and 
surrender of Al Bashir for both the first and second warrants—a 
request submitted to Sudan, all States Parties of the Rome 
Statute, and all of the U.N. Security Council members—been at 
all useful to date in at least galvanizing interest in achieving that 
key objective?  
Fourth, the PTC issued four decisions seeking to enforce the 
arrest warrants against Al Bashir.  These pertained to Al Bashir’s 
visits to Kenya, Chad, and the Central African Republic in the latter 
half of 2010.  None of these countries arrested Al Bashir during his 
visits and none of the countries submitted requested reports to the 
ICC.   
What explains the total lack of cooperation by 
neighboring African states—all States Parties to the ICC—in the 
arrest of Al Bashir during his many travels in 2010?  In its 
report to the Security Council, the ICC stated, “[M]any 
challenges remain, but none is more pressing than the execution 
of the nine outstanding warrants of arrest.” Is the ICC facing a 
crisis of legitimacy, particularly among its own States Parties? 
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3. In the case of Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, charged with three 
war crimes pertaining to the September 29, 2007, attack against the 
African Union Mission in Sudan—the peacekeeping mission 
stationed at the Haskanita Military Group Site in Umm Kadada, 
Darfur—the Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously declined to confirm 
the charges on February 8, 2010.  The PTC was not satisfied that 
there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe Abu Garda could be held criminally responsible either as a 
direct or indirect co-perpetrator for the commission of the crimes 
charged by the Prosecutor. 
How did Abu Garda escape prosecution?  Did what the 
PTC determined meet the Rome Statute’s requirement that 
there be “sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds” to 
believe that the crimes occurred and that the person charged 
committed those crimes?  Why, on April 23, 2010, did the PTC 
reject the Prosecutor’s application to appeal?  Is the Prosecutor 
intending to further investigate Abu Garda? 
Central African Republic 
The trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo commenced on 
November 22, 2010.  Bemba was the President and Commander-in-
Chief of the Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC).  An armed 
conflict took place in the CAR from October 26, 2002, to March 15, 
2003, during which part of the national armed forces of Ange-Felix 
Patasse, the then President of the CAR, allied with combatants of the 
MLC, led by Bemba, were confronted by a rebel movement led by 
Francois Bozize, the former Chief-of-Staff of the Central African 
armed forces.  Bemba is charged with knowing that MLC troops 
were committing crimes and did not take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his power to prevent or repress their 
commission.  There are 759 victims authorized to participate in the 
proceedings. 
Why is the Bemba trial so important for the Prosecutor?  
Was it primarily the rape charges that elevated the importance 
of this case?  Are there ongoing investigations relating to other 
possible suspects? 
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Uganda 
 In light of the failure to arrest any of the indicted 
fugitives of the three surviving Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
leaders, including Joseph Kony, how would you describe the 
status of the Uganda cases and any ongoing investigations?  
What occurred in the Ugandan Government in 2010 either to 
strengthen or weaken complementarity practice in that country?  
How have the indictments affected the behavior and conduct of 
the LRA and its leaders?  Is there any particular arrest strategy 
that the OTP favors, namely, large-scale military operations 
(akin to what happened one year ago cross-border with the 
DRC) or “undercover” efforts? 
Kenya 
 A disputed election and subsequent political/ethnic violence 
in 2007 left more than 1,100 dead, 3,500 injured, and up to 600,000 
people forcibly displaced. During 60 days of violence, there were 
hundreds of rapes, if not more, and over 100,000 properties were 
destroyed in six of Kenya’s eight provinces. The clashes erupted 
along tribal lines following an announcement that Mwai Kibaki—a 
Kikuyu—had won a vote that opponents said was rigged. The 
bloodbath ended when President Kibaki and his rival, Raila Odinga, 
agreed to share power, with Mr. Odinga becoming prime minister. 
The situation in Kenya was brought before the ICC when the 
OTP received information about crimes committed in Kenya in 
relation to the post-election violence of 2007-2008. Following an 
analysis, the Prosecutor took the view that there is a reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation. 
On March 31, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber granted the 
Prosecutor’s request to commence an investigation on crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed in Kenya.  The majority found that 
the information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that 
crimes against humanity have been committed on Kenyan territory.  
The majority found that all criteria for the exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction were satisfied to the requisite standard of proof. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul held that 
the crimes committed in Kenya do not qualify as crimes against 
humanity under the jurisdictional ambit of the Statute. In particular, 
Judge Kaul disagreed with the majority on the requirements of a 
“State or organizational policy” as set out in Article 7(2)(a) of the 
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Statute. Given the fact that the fundamental rationale of crimes 
against humanity as codified in Article 7 of the Statute was to protect 
the international community against the extremely grave threat 
emanating from such policies, Judge Kaul concluded that it had to be 
adopted either by a State or at the policy-making level of a State-like 
organization. Upon analysis of the supporting material, Judge Kaul 
concluded that there was no reasonable basis to believe that the 
crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of Kenya in 
relation to the post-election violence of 2007-2008 were committed 
in an attack against a civilian population pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a policy stemming from a State or an organization. 
Describe how the majority and Judge Hans-Peter Kaul 
disagreed about a critical definitional factor in determining 
whether crimes against humanity had occurred in Kenya, 
regarding their respective opinions in the Pre-Trial Chamber on 
March 31, 2010.  The OTP clearly disagrees with Judge Kaul, 
but what should we conclude about his reading of the available 
evidence?  Isn’t it particularly hard, as an investigator, to satisfy 
the “State or organizational policy” requirement of crimes 
against humanity? 
On December 15, 2010, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo 
requested that the ICC issue summonses to appear against six 
Kenyan citizens to face justice for massive crimes committed during 
the post-election violence in Kenya. The OTP brought two cases, 
three defendants each, and requested summons to appear for each. 
The Prosecutor concluded that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe crimes against humanity were committed in two cases. 
The first case names the following Odinga allies: Henry Kosgey, 
Minister for Industrialization; William Ruto, suspended Education 
Minister; and Joshua Arap Sang, radio executive.  Moreno-Ocampo 
alleged that Ruto began plotting attacks on supporters of President 
Mwai Kibaki a year before the election and worked together with 
Minister for Industrialization Henry Kosgey and radio broadcaster 
Joshua Sang to coordinate a campaign of killing and forced 
deportations in the Rift Valley. 
In the second case, the Prosecution names the following 
Kibaki allies: Uhuru Kenyatta, deputy Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister; Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Secretary to the Cabinet; and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, former Police Chief.  Moreno-Ocampo 
charged Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta—son of Kenyan 
independence hero and founding president Jomo Kenyatta—
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alongside Cabinet Secretary Francis Muthaura and former Police 
Commissioner Major General Mohammed Hussein Ali with murder, 
deportation, persecution, rape, and inhumane acts allegedly 
committed in retaliation against supporters of Prime Minister Raila 
Odinga. 
The accused all proclaimed their innocence. 
In December 2010, Kenyan MPs voted overwhelmingly for 
the country to pull out of the Rome Statute. According to the BBC, if 
the government backs the MPs it would take at least a year for 
Kenya to formally withdraw from the ICC, but active cases would 
not be halted.  In January 2011, a special division of the Kenyan 
High Court emerged as the local option to try the “Ocampo Six,” the 
six persons named in the submissions by the ICC OTP to the Pre-
Trial Chamber requesting indictments. Both sides of the Coalition 
Government agreed to create a local alternative to the ICC. The 
government recalled Parliament for a vote overhauling the Judiciary 
and Kenya Police Service. The agreement includes expediting the 
appointments with the intention of expediting the appointment of a 
new Chief Justice, Attorney General, Director of Public 
Prosecutions, and Inspector General of Police; moving quickly to 
recruit new office holders, including both high court and appellate 
judges; and establishing the Supreme Court to give the judiciary a 
new face and the capacity to handle the post-election chaos cases.  
The hope is that with new faces at the Judiciary and Police force, the 
U.N. Security Council would ask the ICC to defer the case against 
the Kenyans.  Kenyan officials are lobbying other African leaders for 
support. 
The only constitutional way to try the Ocampo Six is to 
create a special division of the High Court, as the new Constitution 
prohibits creation of a local tribunal that works outside the 
jurisdiction of the Kenya criminal system.  In Article 162(1), the 
Constitution states: "The superior courts are the Supreme Court, the 
High Court and the courts referred to in clause 2 (which are to be 
established by Parliament)."  This means that a special division of 
the High Court, as provided for in the International Crimes Act, 
which defines the crimes against humanity, genocide and war 
crimes, is the only option. Section 8(2) of the International Crimes 
Act, states: “A trial authorised by this section to be conducted in 
Kenya shall be conducted in the High Court.” 
There now is a serious complementarity challenge afoot 
in Kenya.  What is the OTP’s response to that challenge and 
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what strategy might we see unfold in the weeks ahead?  What 
does this say about the conduct of a State Party during various 
stages of an investigative and indictment procedure?  Kenya 
appears to have worked its way through this process a bit 
chaotically and, not surprisingly, with politics as a dominant 
feature.  Might this experience speak to a new start for 
cooperation agreements where State Parties agree, in advance, to 
follow established procedures under complementarity and 
ultimately ICC jurisdictional action so as to avoid the likes of 
Kenya’s belated January initiative? 
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA  (SENIOR PROSECUTING TRIAL ATTORNEY TOM HANNIS 
AND DEFENSE COUNSEL RODNEY DIXON) 
Vujadin Popovi  et al. (Srebrenica) 
The Trial Chamber rendered its judgment on June 10, 2010.  
All seven Bosnian Serb defendants were found guilty and sentenced 
to imprisonment ranging from five years to life imprisonment.  The 
Trial Chamber found that there was a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) 
to murder and a JCE to forcibly remove civilians.  It also found that 
some members of the JCE to murder had genocidal intent and thus 
genocide was committed at Srebrenica.  Both JCEs also had the 
requisite special intent for the crime of persecution.  There was a 
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population.  This 
attack commenced with the issuance of Directive 7 and had various 
components, including the strangulation of the enclaves through the 
restriction of humanitarian supplies, the gradual weakening and 
disabling of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and 
a planned military assault on the enclaves, and culminated in the 
removal of thousands of people from Srebrenica and Zepa.  
Applying the legal elements of the crimes charged in the indictment 
to the proven facts, the Trial Chamber found that the following 
crimes were committed by members of the Bosnian Serb forces in 
various locations alleged in the indictment: genocide; conspiracy to 
commit genocide; extermination as a crime against humanity; 
murder, cruel and inhuman treatment, terrorizing civilians, and 
forcible transfer, as acts of persecution and a crime against 
humanity; and forcible transfer as an inhumane act and crime against 
humanity.  The Trial Chamber did not find that the crime of 
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deportation had been proven.  Individual criminal responsibility was 
found against Popovi , Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir 
Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero, and Vinko Pandurevic. 
Remind us what the Prosecution emphasized during its 
closing arguments in early September 2009 for the on-going 
Srebrenica joint trial.  Given the historical significance of the 
Srebrenica genocide, how did prior judgments relating to 
Srebrenica and the trials yet to proceed on Srebrenica (Karadži  
and Mladi ) influence the Prosecution’s strategy?  What were 
the most significant moments in the trial, from the perspective of 
the Prosecution?  How did you argue the case against the 
defendants on the issue of superior orders, which they must have 
relied upon heavily for their defense?  Why was this case against 
three senior Bosnian Serb security officers for the genocide at 
Srebrenica re-opened by the Prosecution after the Defense rested 
its case on March 12, 2009?  Did the four rebuttal witnesses 
called by the Prosecution from late March to early May 2009 
ultimately prove to be significant testimony?   
Discuss the significance of this Srebrenica judgment, not 
only for international criminal law but also for the survivors of 
the genocide and for the legacy of the ICTY.  Is this what it was 
all about?  Has this judgment resonated throughout the 
Balkans? 
Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj (Kosovo) 
On July 21, 2010, the Appeals Chamber ordered a partial re-
trial on certain acquittals of all three defendants based on the failure 
of the Trial Chamber to grant the Prosecution an adequate extension 
to acquire the testimony of two key witnesses.  The majority stated 
that the Trial Chamber “failed to appreciate the gravity of the threat 
that witness intimidation posed to the trial’s integrity,” which 
“undermined the fairness of the proceedings as guaranteed by the 
Statute and Rules and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”  The 
Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber “seriously erred in 
failing to take adequate measures to secure the testimony” of key 
witnesses.  While the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that decisions 
regarding testimony of witnesses are within the Trial Chamber’s 
discretion, because “serious witness intimidation…formed the 
context of the trial,” the Trial Chamber’s “error undermined the 
fairness of the proceedings as guaranteed by the Statute and Rules 
and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”  The Appeals Chamber also 
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criticized the Trial Chamber for placing “undue emphasis” on the 
Trial Chamber’s deadlines for presenting evidence, regardless of the 
need to ensure the testimony of two key witnesses.  This “misplaced 
priority,” the Appeals Chamber continued, “demonstrates that the 
Trial Chamber failed to appreciate the gravity of the threat that 
witness intimidation posed to the trial’s integrity.” 
Presiding Judge Robinson’s dissent stated in paragraph 32 
that “[t]he Majority Opinion constitutes an overstepping by the 
Appeals Chamber of its boundaries, and in doing so, confuses the 
appellate with the trial function.  This is a dangerous precedent, 
which militates against the proper discharge by the Tribunal of its 
mandate to try persons for serious breaches of international 
humanitarian law.”  His reasons:  1) The Trial Chamber was 
sensitive to the importance of both witnesses’ testimony for the 
Prosecution’s case and the general atmosphere of fear and 
intimidation of witnesses by extending the case three times, and 
remaining open to the possibility of granting a further extension 
upon a showing by the Prosecution of a dramatic change in 
circumstances.  2) The majority opinion amounts to “a substitution 
of its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the Trial 
Chamber, and that can only be done where a discernible error on the 
part of the Trial Chamber can be demonstrated.”  No error was 
demonstrated.  3) By prioritizing the Prosecution’s right to present 
its case through these witnesses over the right of the accused to an 
expeditious trial, the majority “wrongly interpreted the relationship 
between Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute, completely ignoring the 
fact that the rights enumerated under Article 20 are to be applied 
“with full respect for the rights of the accused” under Article 21(4). 
Dixon:  What is the Defense strategy for the partial re-
trial?  What are we to understand about the alleged intimidation 
of the two witnesses and their non-show in the first trial?  How 
do you, as Defense counsel, interpret due process standards in 
light of the Appeals Chamber’s apparent attempt to enforce 
them and achieve a fair trial?  How do you square the right to an 
expeditious trial with the complete presentation of evidence, 
particularly incriminating evidence?  How do you interpret 
Judge Robinson’s dissent and are you arguing those points in the 
partial re-trial?  According to Robinson, did the Appeals 
Chamber substitute its discretion for the Trial Chamber’s 
without finding error first? How has the partial re-trial been 
received in Kosovo?  In Serbia? 
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Hannis: Is this a clear cut victory for the Prosecution so 
far?  Were you hoping for a re-trial on additional issues?  What 
will the Trial Chamber undertake to secure the testimony of the 
two witnesses?  
Radovan Karadži  
Following a Trial Chamber decision of November 5, 2009, 
Karadži  had to accept being joined by a counsel representing his 
interests in the courtroom.  That individual, Richard Harvey, was 
appointed by the Registrar on November 19, 2009.  The Chamber’s 
decision found that Karadži  had “substantially and persistently 
obstructed the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial,” meeting 
the test for appointment of counsel set out by the Appeals Chamber 
in the Miloševi  case.  The Chamber ordered the Registar to appoint 
a counsel to prepare to represent the interests of Karadži  at trial, and 
ordered that the trial resume on March 1, 2010.  However, the 
Chamber further stated that Karadži  would continue to represent 
himself, including by dealing with day-to-day matters and by 
preparing for trial, but that “should the accused continue to absent 
himself from the resumed trial proceedings in March, or should he 
engage in any other conduct that obstructs the proper and 
expeditious conduct of the trial, he will forfeit his right to self-
representation, no longer be entitled to assistance from his assigned 
Defense team, and the appointed counsel will take over as an 
assigned counsel to represent him.”   On March 1 and 2, 2010, 
Karadži  made his opening statement and the Prosecution started 
presenting evidence on April 13, 2010.  The trial continued through 
2010. 
How has Karadži ’s self-representation (aided by 
appointed counsel) worked out during 2010?  How has the 
Prosecution presented its case against him and what kind of 
witnesses and incriminating documentation are being presented 
by the Prosecution?  Have there been any defense challenges for 
exculpatory evidence?  Has the Karadži  trial been adequately 
covered by the media, or has the trial gone subterranean?  To 
what extent is Mladi ’s absence in The Hague detrimental to the 
prosecution of Karadži ? 
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Vojislav Šešelj  
There were several rulings of interest in the Šešelj case.  On 
July 5, 2010, the Registry denied Šešelj’s request for the ICTY to 
fund his trial because he had not provided the necessary 
documentation.  On October 29, however, the Trial Chamber ordered 
the court to fund 50 percent of what would normally be given to an 
indigent defendant.  In November 2010, the Registry asked the 
Appeals Chamber to quash the Trial Chamber’s decision about 
funding, arguing that it had essentially usurped the Registry’s power. 
Does the OTP have a dog in this fight?  Why would the 
Trial Chamber challenge the Registrar on this issue? 
On February 2010, for the second time, Šešelj was charged 
with contempt of court for disclosing information about 11 witnesses 
in one of his books.   
How has this charge of contempt of court progressed 
through the year?  How do you balance the right of an accused 
to defend himself with the right of witnesses to their security and 
privacy? 
Prli , Stoji , Praljak, Petkovi , ori , and Pusi  (ethnic cleansing of 
Muslims/non-Serbs) 
On September 16, 2010, the Defense filed a motion seeking 
the disqualification of Judge Prandler on grounds of bias.  On 
October 4, 2010, President Patrick Robinson denied the motion, 
finding that the Defenses of Prli  and Praljak had failed to 
substantiate any of their claims and therefore that it is not warranted 
to appoint a panel to consider the motion.  They had not established 
any actual bias or the appearance of bias on the part of Judge 
Prandler and had not rebutted the strong presumption of his 
impartiality.   
On December 15, 2010, the Trial Chamber ruled on Stoji ’s 
November 30, 2010, Motion for Certification to Appeal the 
Chamber’s denial on November 25, 2010, to reopen his case and 
admit 66 documents requested by the Stoji  Defense in order to 
refute evidence submitted by the Prosecution.  The Chamber denied 
the motion. 
The Trial Chamber will hear the closing arguments for the 
Prosecution on February 7, 2011, and for the Defense once the 
Prosecutor has concluded.  Final trial briefs were filed on January 4, 
2011. 
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  How did the Prosecution present the evidence of ethnic 
cleansing and align the defendants with the criminal acts 
associated with ethnic cleansing?  Is this a particularly strong 
case on persecution (ethnic cleansing)? 
Mom ilo Periši   (Sarajevo and Zagreb, assaults on civilians) 
The Prosecution completed its presentation of evidence on 
November 12, 2009, and the Defense began its case on February 22, 
2010.  One of the Defense’s major contentions is that the military 
and political leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did 
not influence the VRS or General Mladi .  On March 18, 2010, 
Milenko Jevdjevic, commander of the signals battalion in the VRS 
Drina Corps testified on Periši ’s behalf.  He asserted that after 
Mladi ’s attack on Gorazde in April 1994, he received a message 
from Periši  in which Periši  “kindly asked” Mladi  to “stop any 
further actions of the VRS.” 
On March 19, 2010, Periši  filed a motion for a temporary 
provisional release for the duration of the adjournment of the trial 
from April 2, 2010, until the trial resumed on April 12, 2010.  On 
March 31, 2010, the Trial Chamber denied the Defense’s motion.  
Although the Trial Chamber conceded that Periši  did not pose a 
potential danger or flight risk, it maintained that a temporary 
provisional release is not appropriate in the absence of compelling 
humanitarian reasons for granting it. 
Were there any significant developments in the Periši  
trial during 2010 and any testimony or evidence that proved 
particularly revealing about the role of this key individual in the 
leadership of the VJ? Why is Mom ilo Periši ’s case so 
significant regarding how military forces lay siege to cities? 
Šainovi , Ojdani , Pavkovi , Lazarevi , and Luki  (Kosovo) 
Following the February 26, 2009, Trial Chamber judgment, 
which found Milan Milutinovi  not guilty, the other defendants 
appealed and status conferences were held in May and September 
2010.  The next is scheduled for January 2011.  The decisions 
handed down in 2010 by the Appeals Chamber covered admission of 
additional evidence by the Defense, motions for temporary release 
on compassionate grounds, and Defense motions for extension of 
time.  On September 7, 2010, the Appeals Chamber approved the 
filing of David Scheffer’s amicus curiae brief pertaining to the 
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proper standard for aiding and abetting liability in the case 
concerning Ojdani .  A reply brief by counsel to Ojdani  was filed. 
What is the OTP’s view of the appeals in this case and 
what can we expect to see unfold in 2011?   I question the time 
lapse between the filing of the appeals briefs and the action of 
the Appeals Chamber. The briefs were filed in 2009 and the next 
action is a status conference in January 2011.  Perhaps this is a 
good moment to ask everyone on the panel how to manage the 
sheer size of the cases before the tribunals in ways that make 
things more efficient.   
How do the OTP and Mr. Dixon view the 
intent/knowledge standard for aiding and abetting liability, 
which is central to the Ojdani  case? 
Vlastimir Dordevi   (Kosovo) 
The Prosecution originally closed its case on October 29, 
2009, but reopened it to examine one more witness on May 17, 2010.  
On May 20, 2010, the Defense rested its case.  Closing arguments 
were heard on July 13 and 14, 2010.  Judgment is pending. 
What is the back story about the new witness presented 
by the Prosecution, and do you consider his/her testimony as 
proving significant to the forthcoming judgment?  How did the 
Prosecution consider the overall trial record of the Dordevi  
case?   
Ratko Mladi  and Goran Hadži   (at large) 
What was accomplished during 2010 to bring the 
Prosecution closer to the apprehension of Mladi  and Hadži ?  
Why have their apprehensions proven so difficult?  How did 
Serbia’s efforts to seek admission to the European Union 
progress despite the fact that Mladi  remains at large?  Does the 
Prosecutor have a position on Serbia’s application to the E.U. 
and any conditionality related to Mladi  in particular that 
should be associated with it?   
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III. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 
(REGISTRAR ADAMA DIENG AND DEFENSE COUNSEL RODNEY DIXON) 
A. General 
Mr. Registrar:  You are completing your tenth year as 
Registrar of the ICTR.  Share with us some reflections about 
that decade of service.   
 
 —How has the ICTR evolved during the last decade?  
What is the most significant difference today in its operations 
from the day you began serving as Registrar in January 2011? 
 —During the mid-1990s, the ICTR had great difficulties 
with charges of inefficiency and even corruption.  That tarnished 
the international reputation of the ICTR at the time.  Yet the 
operation and work product of the ICTR since the late 1990s 
and through the last decade has been impressive.  Explain how 
that came about and how you cast off the demons of that early 
period. 
 —How do you assess the Security Council’s recent 
approval of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals?  Explain how this will enable the ICTR to achieve its 
completion strategy and wrap up its docket of cases, at least to 
some reasonable extent, and then transition to the Residual 
Mechanism.  Do you foresee any particular difficulties in that 
process over the coming years? 
 —You worked with two different prosecutors, Carla del 
Ponte and Hassan Jallow.  I don’t expect you to speak “out of 
school” here, but compare them a bit for us.   
 —How has your relationship with the Government of 
Rwanda fared during these years?  I know Mr. Dixon is on stage 
with you here and should address this question too.   But it is 
important to understand what the concerns and mandates of the 
ICTR have been that have clashed with those of the Rwandan 
government.  This was a mighty problem in the 1990s and it 
continued through the last decade, particularly on the issues of 
arrests and delegation of cases to Rwandan courts. 
 —How difficult has the financial situation for the ICTR 
been during the last decade?  How do you explain to government 
officials and the public that the costs of the ICTR relative to 
other national courts and how their budgets are allocated are 
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comparatively reasonable, if not a bargain given the dimensions 
of the crimes committed in Rwanda?  
 —You were instrumental in the creation of the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights.  Are you confident that 
regional court can begin to pick up where the ICTR leaves off in 
its final years of operation?  Can the African Court begin to 
address atrocity crimes and if so, how might it do so in the 
coming years? 
 
During 2010, the Tribunal rendered five trial and two appeals 
judgments, leaving ten pending judgments at the trial level.  
According to the Completion Strategy Report released on December 
6, 2010, the Tribunal’s President, Judge Byron, stated that the 
Tribunal expects “four trials with respect to 15 accused in the first 
half of 2011, and the remaining six judgments with respect to seven 
accused before the end of 2011.”   To accomplish this, the Tribunal 
has requested authorization for three judges’ terms to be extended. 
President Byron projected that the Tribunal expects to 
complete the evidentiary stage in the first quarter of 2011 for its four 
currently ongoing trials and begin the last new trial in January 2012.   
President Byron also anticipated “one or more proceedings for 
contempt of court and the hearings for preservation of evidence in 
the cases of three fugitives under Rule 71 bis.”  Ten fugitives remain 
at large. 
President Byron cited problems regarding resettlement of 
acquitted persons and relocation of convicted persons who have 
served their sentences.   He cautioned: “The issue of the relocation of 
[released convicts] needs urgent attention, as there will be many 
persons in this position in the coming years.  If this problem is not 
dealt with in a comprehensive, long-term approach, the interests of 
justice and the rule of law will not be served.”   He called upon the 
international community to help solve this long-term problem.  
Finally, President Byron emphasized that the ICTR’s 
progress has been severely hampered by staff retention issues and 
projected that if the problem remains unaddressed, significant 
additional delays could be expected:  “In 2010, the Tribunal lost 
almost 100 staff members.  For the Chambers alone, the number is 
19, representing a high percentage of our staffing level.”   “If the 
problem is not solved,” he warned, “we cannot exclude further 
delays in judgments.”  
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B. Dominique Ntawukulilyayo 
On August 2, 2010, the Trial Chamber released its Judgment 
and Sentence of Ntawukulilyayo, finding him guilty of only one 
count of genocide and not guilty of complicity in genocide or direct 
and public incitement of genocide.  The Prosecutor decided not to 
appeal the 25-year sentence.  
How did the Prosecutor fail on so many counts of 
genocide and why was there “insufficient evidence?”  One 
wonders whether the Prosecutor’s decision not to appeal the 25-
year sentence, rather than seek life imprisonment, stems from 
his loss on the other counts or some larger strategy of sentencing 
concerning genocide before the ICTR.   
C. Callixte Kalimanzira (Convicted) 
Callixte Kalimanzira was the former acting Minister of the 
Interior. On October 20, 2010, the Appeals Chamber ruled on the 
appeal from the Trial Chamber judgment convicting him of genocide 
and sentencing him to 30 years imprisonment.  Because almost all of 
Kalimanzira’s convictions were reversed, the Appeals Chamber held 
that this represented a significant reduction in his culpability, calling 
for a revision of his sentence.  However, it also noted that 
Kalimanzira’s conviction for aiding and abetting genocide at Kabuye 
Hill was affirmed, and therefore Kalimanzira remained convicted of 
an extremely serious crime.  The Appeals Chamber reduced his 
sentence to 25 years imprisonment. 
Standard of specificity for indictments: The Trial Chamber 
found that vagueness in an indictment was “cured” by the summary 
of a witness’s anticipated testimony, the witness’s prior statement, 
and the Prosecution’s opening statement.   
The Appeals Chamber found this was an error in law.  
What are the standards for indictments? 
Standard of de novo review by the Appeals Chamber of the 
evidence:  The Trial Chamber found Kalimanzira guilty of direct and 
public incitement to genocide based in part on a speech he gave. The 
Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had misconstrued 
the testimony of witnesses, including other legal and factual errors, 
and granted the Kalimanzira’s appeal on this point.  One wonders 
about the review of evidence/testimony that the Appeals Chamber 
did not hear directly.   
 
2011] D A V I D  S C H E F F E R  261
What standard do they use to correctly construe that 
testimony, to the point where they will overturn the Trial 
Chamber’s interpretation? 
The role of hearsay in international criminal courts:  The 
Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber’s lack of explanation 
for accepting hearsay was an error of law, which made a witness’s 
identification of Kalimanzira at the Gisagara Marketplace not 
established beyond a reasonable doubt.   
What is the role of hearsay in the courts, particularly 
considering the time lapse between the events and the trial?  And 
if a court does not have the exclusionary rules regarding hearsay 
that U.S. courts have, then what standard do they use to assign 
weight, and is it really an error of law not to explain the Trial 
Chamber’s reasoning in accepting hearsay evidence? 
D. Emmanuel Rukundo 
On October 20, 2010, the Appeals Chamber ruled, reducing 
Rukundo’s sentence from 25 to 23 years imprisonment.  The 
Appeals Chamber reversed Rukundo’s conviction of committing 
genocide by causing serious mental harm to a young female Tutsi 
woman by sexually assaulting her.  The Trial Chamber based its 
inference of genocidal intent on a totality of the circumstances.  The 
Appeals Chamber reversed on the ground that the inference drawn 
from the circumstantial evidence must be the only reasonable 
inference available, and that here it was not.  Judge Pocar dissented, 
citing ICTY jurisprudence that even a purely sexual intent does not 
preclude intent to harm, and that the rape/assault does not need to be 
part of a systematic rape/sexual assault, but rather that the attack be 
systematic.   
Where does this leave the inclusion of rape as a basis for 
genocide?  Does this judgment undo some of the gains made by 
the ICTY?  How does the Appeals Judgment square with the 
finding of rape as genocide in the confirmation of charges of 
genocide against President Al Bashir in the Darfur situation 
before the ICC? 
E. Butare (Nyiramasuhuko et al.) 
Right to an amicus curiae report on witness testimony:  The 
Trial Chamber ordered the Registrar to appoint an independent 
amicus curiae to investigate the alleged false testimony of the 
 
 A T R O C I T Y  C R I M E S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W   [Vol. 9 262
witnesses and related allegations of contempt.  In March 2009, the 
Chamber directed the Registrar to appoint a new amicus curiae to 
conduct a thorough investigation and to present a report to the 
Chamber.  The Defense requested a copy and was denied.  The 
Defense argued that the credibility of the witnesses and information 
relating to the guilt of the accused are in the report, and to that end, 
they should have access to this information to be able to fairly 
defend their client(s).   
Why wouldn’t the Trial Chamber release the report?  Is 
the Trial Chamber going too far into the civil law model and 
hamstringing the Defense’s ability to do its job?  If the concern is 
retaliation of some sort by the accused, then what about 
implementing some variant of the solution used in the 
Guantanamo cases, where the accused is often not allowed to 
have access to classified information that the defense lawyers can 
access and use? 
F. Yussuf Munyakazi 
On July 5, 2010, the Trial Chamber found Munyakazi guilty 
of genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity, but he 
was found not guilty of complicity in genocide as the Chamber 
found that the Prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Munyakazi participated in a joint criminal enterprise, as alleged 
in the indictment.  He was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.  
Earlier, on March 17, 2010, the Trial Chamber granted the Defense 
motion for a site visit and directed the Registry to make all necessary 
arrangements to make the visits from May 30 to June 2, 2010.  
However, on May 7, 2010, the Chamber deemed that a material 
change in circumstances occurred and, having reviewed new 
evidence, determined that they can assess the evidence without a site 
visit, thus cancelling it. 
What was the importance of a site visit for the Defense so 
late in the proceedings?  Why are site visits important to the 
Defense, Prosecution, or judges?  Has the ICTR often arranged 
for site visits and has it been shown they help judges in arriving 
at judgment? 
G. The Arrest of Defense Counsel Peter Erlinder 
Peter Erlinder is the lead counsel for Ntabakuze’s defense.  
On May 28, 2010, he was arrested by Rwandan authorities on 
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charges of “genocide denial.”  Ntabakuze filed a motion for an 
injunction against the Rwandan government regarding the arrest, 
alleging that the “Prosecutor of Rwanda” made it clear that the 
charges are directly connected statements Erlinder made outside 
Rwanda, including in the course of Ntabakuze’s defense.  At the 
time of his arrest, Erlinder was in Rwanda on behalf of opposition 
politician Victoire Ingabire, chairperson of the United Democratic 
Forces political party, who had been seeking to run against President 
Kagame. Ntabakuze argued that these charges “constitute 
intimidation and serious interference with a legal process” and 
directly impact his rights to a fair and expeditious trial.  The Appeals 
Chamber ordered the Registrar to obtain information regarding the 
exact nature and basis of charges brought against Erlinder.  There 
was no response from Rwanda.  On July 7, 2010, the Appeals 
Chamber issued a further order requesting that the Rwandan 
government provide it with such information within ten days of the 
order.  On July 15, 2010, the Registrar filed submissions indicating 
that Rwanda had indicated that Erlinder had not been formally 
charged and that he had been detained as a suspect pending ongoing 
investigations.  He was subsequently released on bail on health 
grounds.  On October 10, 2010, the Appeals Chamber granted 
Ntabakuze’s motion for injunctions in part and issued a request for 
Rwanda to “desist from proceeding against Erlinder in relation to 
words spoken or written in the course of his representation of 
Ntabakuze before the Tribunal.”  The ICTR issued Erlinder 
functional immunity with respect to statements made in his role as 
counsel.  However, the Appeals Chamber rejected the argument that 
this immunity extends to statements made outside his ICTR role. 
Only one month before he was arrested in Rwanda, Erlinder 
had filed a wrongful death lawsuit in the western district court of 
Oklahoma against President Kagame for the alleged assassination of 
the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and his Burundian 
counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira in 1994.  The case was filed on 
behalf of their widows.  On May 22, 2010, six days before his arrest, 
he vowed to “increasingly take the offensive” in reshaping the 
history of what had happened in Rwanda.   
Numerous ICTR defense lawyers threatened to boycott 
proceedings before the ICTR in protest of Erlinder’s arrest.   
What is the current status of Erlinder regarding both the 
ICTR and the Rwandan government?   Are Defense counsel 
before the ICTR at heightened risk these days in light of the 
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Rwandan government’s policies?  What should be the proper 
scope of functional immunity for Defense counsel?  What kind of 
impact has this matter had on defense work before the ICTR?  
Was the ICTR too cautious in its response to the situation with 
Erlinder? 
H. Murder of Jwani Mwaikusa, Defense counsel for Yusef Munyakazi 
On July 24, 2010, Jwani Mwaikusa, defense attorney at the 
ICTR and law professor at the University of Dar es Salam, was 
murdered outside his home in Tanzania.  Munyakazi had been 
convicted for genocide and crimes against humanity on June 30, 
2010.  He had planned to appeal the decision and his 25-year 
sentence.  Earlier in the year, Mwaikusa had blocked a motion by the 
Rwandan government to transfer the trial of Munyakazi and three 
other defendants from the ICTR in Tanzania to Rwanda.  He 
successfully argued that Rwanda lacked an independent judiciary 
and that the defendants would not receive a fair trial there. 
Is there any update on this murder case and its 
implications for the ICTR and defense counsel in general? 
I. ICTR Complaint to U.N. Security Council regarding lack of Kenyan 
Cooperation 
On June 18, 2010, Prosecutor Hassan Jallow told the U.N. 
Security Council that Kenya has failed to cooperate with the ICTR in 
capturing Felicien Kabuga, an indicted fugitive accused of financing 
the 1994 genocide.  “Despite the copious evidence of Kabuga’s 
entry, residence, activities and occasional reported sightings of him 
in that country, Kenya has neither arrested him nor provided the 
information requested by the prosecutor to assist in the tracking and 
arrest of this fugitive,” he said.  Kabuga is the most wanted of 11 
genocide suspects sought by the ICTR and still at large.  The United 
States has placed a $5 million bounty on his head.   
Why is Kenya not cooperating with the ICTR regarding 
the capture of Kabuga?  What other difficulties is the ICTR 
experiencing regarding efforts to track and apprehend other 
indicted fugitives? 
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IV. SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (CHIEF OF PROSECUTIONS 
AND HEAD OF OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, JIM JOHNSON) 
Charles Taylor Trial (Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor) 
General Questions 
Charles Taylor was under direct examination for 13 weeks in 
2009 (and under cross examination for 11 weeks at the beginning of 
2010). It has been said that both the Court and the Prosecution were 
too lenient during the direct examination in allowing Taylor to 
answer questions in long narratives, effectively recounting his life 
beginning with his childhood. Taylor was allowed to discuss issues 
that were not directly related to the questions asked, such as his role 
in the Doe coup in 1980 and his escape from a Massachusetts jail in 
1985.  On occasion, some of Taylor’s arguably irrelevant answers 
were even factually incorrect. 
Considering the claim that this may have been a Defense 
strategy to overwhelm judges with information, what was the 
Prosecution’s strategy in dealing with a volume of irrelevant and 
potentially incorrect information in cross-examination? How did 
you draw the line between correcting all the information and 
therefore adding to the volume of information to sift through, 
and challenging Taylor’s credibility as a witness?  
1. “Fresh Evidence” Part 1: The Legal Issue Decided in 2009 
In November 2009, the Trial Chamber decided that the 
Prosecution could introduce “fresh evidence,” which, in this Court, 
refers to documents that the Prosecution wanted to use during cross-
examination of Defense witnesses and that were not admitted during 
the Prosecution’s case-in-chief.  The decision concluded that fresh 
evidence could be used to discredit Mr. Taylor’s testimony.  The 
Prosecution potentially could submit fresh evidence pointing to the 
guilt of the Accused, but it had to be admitted under exceptional 
circumstances and in the interests of justice, as determined on a case-
by-case basis.  
The legal issue is how (and whether) to distinguish between 
evidence used for impeachment purposes and evidence used to prove 
guilt. The Prosecution argued that allowing the admission of fresh 
evidence after the close of the Prosecution’s case was normal 
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practice; the Defense argued that doing so undermined Mr. Taylor’s 
legal rights.  
While allowing the use of fresh evidence, the Court agreed 
with the Defense that the Accused is in a different position than 
other witnesses, and that the court had to be particularly cautious in 
distinguishing between fresh evidence that is intended solely for the 
purpose of impeaching the Accused’s credibility and fresh evidence 
that is probative of the guilt of the accused. The Court mainly 
focused on the distinction between impeachment and proof of guilt, 
while the Prosecution stressed a different distinction between merely 
presenting fresh evidence in cross-examination and later admitting it 
as evidence. 
The Prosecution’s argument depended on a decision in the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) case (Trial Chamber 
II allowed the Prosecution to use fresh evidence to impeach the 
credibility of a witness, and later admitted the document into the 
evidentiary record even though the document also went to prove the 
guilt of the Accused) and on a recent Appeals decision in the ICTY 
Prli  case, which allowed fresh evidence to be introduced during 
cross-examination and also allowed that evidence to be admitted 
later as probative of guilt of the Accused in exceptional 
circumstances and in the interests of justice. The Defense argued that 
the Accused in a trial, acting as a witness (as Taylor was in this 
instance in his own trial), is in a different position from other 
witnesses who testify, particularly in relation to specific rights 
protected under Article 17 of the SCSL Statute, which provides for 
the “Rights of the accused” and includes having adequate time and 
facilities for preparation of his defense, to communicate with 
counsel, and to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and 
cause of the charge against him. 
All documents the Prosecution planned to use had to be given 
to the Defense by December 11, 2009.  Documents only used for the 
purposes of impeachment did not require prior disclosure to the 
Defense. On the other hand, documents that could be probative of 
Taylor’s guilt had to be disclosed to the Defense prior to use in 
examination. Moreover, such probative fresh evidence would not be 
allowed unless for use in cross-examination in the interest of justice 
and unless its use did not violate Taylor’s fair trial rights. 
To determine whether exceptional circumstances may allow 
the Prosecution to use documents as fresh evidence, the Court 
considered (a) when and how the Prosecution obtained the 
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documents, (b) when the Prosecution disclosed the documents to the 
Defense, and (c) why they were offered only after the Prosecution 
closed its case.  
During Taylor’s cross-examination, the Defense objected to 
the admission of many documents presented by the Prosecution. 
Examples included a three paragraph excerpt from the Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Report (one paragraph was allowed while 
two were not), an article by Africa Confidential magazine allegedly 
showing African leaders’ condemnation of Taylor (one sentence in 
the third paragraph that was not probative of guilt was allowed), and 
the IRIN West Africa Update 339 (allowed because nothing in the 
two paragraphs went to guilt).  
In early February 2010, the Court denied all of the 
Prosecution’s applications for leave to appeal the January 2010 oral 
decisions disallowing use of documents in cross-examination. 
On one hand, it can be argued that the Court’s decision 
effectively required the Prosecution to meet a higher burden 
than that required at other tribunals, and before this same Trial 
Chamber in the AFRC case; what are your reactions to this? On 
the other hand, it seems that the Prosecution was pushing the 
boundaries of the evidentiary rules by arguing the value of 
certain evidence. On what basis do you feel that this argument 
was justified? Is it common practice in civil law countries to 
introduce evidence of culpability during a cross-examination? 
What happens if the only way that the Prosecution can introduce 
something related to guilt is through cross-examination of a 
witness, supposing that they have no other witness that could lay 
the foundation for that evidence? How does the fact that it is 
Charles Taylor’s cross-examination at stake here come into 
play?  Should the evidentiary rules change depending on who is 
being cross-examined? 
2. “Fresh Evidence” Part 2: Naomi Campbell, Mia Farrow, Carole White 
Media Frenzy 
From January 2008 to February 2009, the Prosecution called 
91 witnesses, formally closing its case in February 2009. In late June 
2010, the Trial Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request to re-open 
their case and call three additional witnesses (Naomi Campbell, Mia 
Farrow, and Carole White) to testify in August 2010.  
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In June, the Defense portrayed one witness as a high-ranked 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) member and close confidante to 
Foday Sankoh, asserting the witness’s familiarity with RUF efforts 
and goals and his awareness of any support for the RUF coming 
from Taylor. The Witness consistently denied being aware of any 
connection between Taylor and the RUF. This Witness’s testimony 
opened the door for the Prosecution to request to re-open its case so 
as to call Campbell, White, and Farrow.  
The Prosecution had earlier attempted to introduce a 
document in which actress Mia Farrow alleges that Taylor gave 
supermodel Naomi Campbell a blood diamond at a dinner in South 
Africa in 1997. At the time, the judges rejected the use of this 
document, deciding that such “fresh evidence” was neither in the 
interest of justice and was a violation of Taylor’s fair trial rights. 
This purported allegation was first mentioned very early on during 
the Prosecution’s cross-examination in January 2010. 
In May, the Prosecution moved to re-open its case and hear 
testimony from Campbell, White, and Farrow. The Prosecution 
argued that the three witnesses were necessary to prove a central 
issue: that Taylor possessed rough diamonds which he maintained to 
buy arms.  The Prosecution argued that jurisprudence from other 
international criminal courts allows for the Prosecution to re-open 
their case under certain limited circumstances: when the Prosecution 
proves that the evidence, despite due diligence, could not have been 
identified and presented in the case-in-chief.  In the alternative, the 
Prosecution requested that the evidence be presented in rebuttal 
under Rule 85(A), where rebuttal evidence is allowed at the Court’s 
discretion, but must relate to a significant issue arising directly out of 
Defense evidence, which could not reasonably have been 
anticipated. According to Trial Chamber II in the AFRC case, the 
Prosecution must establish that the evidence arose extemporaneously 
during the Defense case-in-chief that was unforeseeable, and that the 
evidence has significant probative value to the determination of an 
issue central to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused. 
The Defense argued that the Court would not find the 
anticipated evidence relevant to the charges against Taylor, that the 
Prosecution failed to meet the legal standards required to re-open its 
case or to provide evidence in rebuttal, and that allowing the 
Prosecution to re-open its case now at such an advanced stage in trial 
would prejudice the administration of justice. The Defense 
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acknowledged that international jurisprudence did indeed recognize 
a party’s right to be granted leave to reopen its case but only in 
“exceptional circumstances,” which the Defense argued the 
Prosecution failed to establish in this case. The Defense also argued 
that subpoenaing Campbell would mainly generate media capital for 
the proceedings and not evidentiary capital necessary to try the case 
fairly. 
In reply, the Prosecution argued that the SCSL Appellate 
jurisprudence provides that the Prosecution must only show a 
“reasonable basis” that the evidence is “likely to be” or that “there is 
at least a good chance” it is of material assistance to the Prosecution. 
The Court found the Prosecution’s request to re-open the case 
as falling within the Court’s discretion, in that the probative value of 
the proposed fresh evidence was not substantially outweighed by the 
need to ensure a fair trial. The Trial Chamber was persuaded that the 
Prosecution not only showed that it could not have obtained and 
presented the fresh evidence during its case-in-chief, with reasonable 
diligence, but that it also acted with such to obtain the evidence, 
attempting to contact Campbell numerous times.  The Trial Chamber 
also found that the proposed fresh evidence was highly probative and 
material to the indictment.  The Defense could not be taken by 
surprise because Farrows’ declaration was disclosed to the Defense 
in December 2009, and the Defense would have the opportunity to 
test the evidence on cross-examination and to make further 
investigations.  
The testimony of supermodel Naomi Campbell gathered 
intense media scrutiny. Campbell testified that she had received dirty 
stones that she did not know were diamonds or that they were from 
Taylor until White and Farrow suggested that they were. Campbell 
also agreed that White was a woman with a powerful motive to lie 
about Campbell. During re-examination, the Prosecution asked 
Campbell why she had previously declined to make public 
comments about the alleged gift. When Campbell responded that she 
had been afraid for her family, the Prosecution then asked whether 
Campbell’s fear of the Accused also led her to deliver testimony that 
was not entirely true.  The Defense objected, arguing that the 
Prosecution could not impeach its own witness, and the Judge 
agreed. In response, the Prosecution attempted to classify Campbell 
as a witness of the Court, and not a Prosecution witness because the 
Prosecution had not had any contact with Campbell prior to her court 
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appearance, but the Judge disagreed, as Campbell had been 
subpoenaed at the Prosecution’s request. 
Farrow’s account differed substantially from Campbell’s 
with respect to the number and size of diamonds received and from 
Campbell’s knowledge about from whom they came. In cross-
examination, the Defense highlighted Farrow’s inability to recall 
details, as well as her lack of personal knowledge of the events at 
issue. Farrow acknowledged that she was not present when 
Campbell received the diamonds. Moreover, her testimony alleging 
that Campbell reported having one huge diamond was contradictory 
to other statements. Defense concluded by attempted to portray 
Farrow as biased against Taylor. Also, the Judges had their own 
questions for her, including a question of whether Farrow got the 
idea of a “huge diamond” from having seen the movie “Blood 
Diamond.” Farrow responded that the movie had not influenced her. 
White’s testimony also differed considerably from 
Campbell’s. White claimed that during dinner, Campbell told her 
that Taylor was going to give her diamonds. White testified that she 
was present when Campbell received the diamonds from two men. 
The Defense attempted to discredit her testimony by demonstrating 
that she was biased against Campbell, using Facebook pages, 
pictures, and commentary that suggested a “blood diamond” party 
held at her office on the night of Campbell’s testimony. 
This testimony, if credible, could be used to discredit 
Taylor’s assertion that he did not possess blood diamonds, and 
contributes to the proof of his culpability (in the assertion that he 
did possess blood diamonds and used them to buy arms).  Does 
this mean that the distinction between the two types of evidence 
from the court’s perspective is really only a theoretical 
distinction? What are the practical applications of the Court’s 
November decision on fresh evidence? What do you think the 
Court should do when evidence satisfies both criteria? 
Considering the timing and the fame-quotient of the three 
additional witnesses, what are your reactions to the claim that 
this was a clever ploy by the Prosecution to refocus the Court’s 
attention and the world’s eye on its case, while disrupting the 
flow of the Defense’s case?  What was the actual value of the 
testimony to the Prosecution’s case, considering the public 
acrimony between the women and the discrepancies in the 
testimony offered? In light of the facts that Campbell was at a 
fundraiser at Taylor’s house, and the fame of the women  and 
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Taylor in 1997, how is it that the Prosecution only learned of the 
evidence related to the gift of diamonds during the Defense’s 
case-in-chief? What is your reaction to the claim that the 
Prosecution had its chance to make its case with the other 91 
witnesses? What are the positive and negative aspects of media 
involvement in the Taylor case? 
3. “Fresh Evidence” Part III: Sesay’s Custodial Statements and 
Testimony 
Defense likely hoped that Sesay’s testimony would 
corroborate Taylor’s claims that he was not the commander of the 
RUF and therefore not responsible for the crimes committed by the 
RUF. Sesay’s testimony seemed to corroborate testimony of prior 
Defense witnesses who claimed that Taylor withdrew his support of 
the RUF in 1992, that the RUF respected civilians and did not recruit 
children, obtained its weapons primarily from the United Liberation 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia, and was controlled exclusively 
by Foday Sankoh.  
The Prosecution sought to use Sesay’s custodial statement 
interview to impeach his testimony, but the Trial Chamber 
unanimously denied the application for this use of fresh evidence as 
it included information that could prove Taylor’s guilt in violation of 
Taylor’s fair trial rights and not in the interests of justice. When the 
Prosecution sought leave to appeal this decision, it was also denied. 
Again, in order to be granted leave to seek interlocutory appeal of a 
Trial Chamber decision, the moving party must show irreparable 
prejudice and exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the Prosecution 
again applied for disclosure of all witness statements in this period, 
arguing that the statements differed significantly from his in-court 
testimony. The Defense and Prosecution reiterated their arguments 
from previous applications and objections. Moreover, consistent with 
earlier decisions, the Trial Chamber dismissed this application for 
disclosure. Nevertheless, the Prosecution relied heavily on the 
summaries during cross examination, particularly of DCT-008, and 
the Judges allowed the summaries into evidence as sought by the 
Prosecution. 
How damaging was the Trial Chamber’s denial of the 
Prosecution’s application for such use of fresh evidence, and was 
the denial of appeal reasonable? 
 
 A T R O C I T Y  C R I M E S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W   [Vol. 9 272
4. Disclosure of Witness Statements 
The first nine defense witnesses testified between February 
and April 2010. The first six focused on Taylor’s time in Libya, the 
use of child soldiers, and how the RUF acquired guns and 
ammunition, and much of their testimony was in closed session. The 
primary legal issue during this period involved the Prosecution’s 
requests for access to Defense witness statements and witness 
summaries.  
The Prosecution argued that the summaries provided by the 
Defense for three witnesses were inadequate for the Prosecution to 
prepares its cross examination of the witnesses, and that some 
witness testimonies in court were inconsistent with the Defense 
summaries. The Defense argued that the presumption of Rule 73ter 
was that the Prosecution would receive summaries of a witness’s 
statement, not the complete statements, and that Prosecution had to 
prove by prima facie evidence that it would suffer undue or 
irreparable prejudice should it not receive a witness statement for the 
Court to order such disclosure. The Defense also argued that the 
jurisprudence of the SCSL, ICTR, and ICTY supported its 
contention that Defense witness summaries did not have to be as 
detailed as Prosecution witness summaries given to the Defense.  
The Court agreed with the principle laid down by the ICTY 
Appeals Judgment in Prosecutor v. Tadi , where the Chamber 
decided that there was no blanket right for the Prosecution to see the 
witness statement of a Defense witness. The Prosecution could only 
apply for a disclosure, while the Chamber retained the discretion to 
make case-by-case decisions. 
The Court only granted one disclosure of a witness statement 
for DCT-179, basing the decision on being in the interest of justice 
due to the apparent contradiction between the information provided 
in DCT-179’s witness summaries and his evidence-in-chief 
regarding a period relevant to the indictment. In other requests for 
disclosure, the Court mostly allowed the Prosecution additional time 
to prepare their cross-examination. 
What was the impact on the trial of the Court’s denial of 
the Prosecution’s effort to gain greater access to the Defense 
witness summaries? 
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5. Prosecution Allegations and Strategies 
i) Summary of Prosecution Allegations  
The Prosecution sought to undermine Taylor’s credibility as 
a witness and focused primarily on Taylor’s claim that he was 
appointed by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Committee of Five (a group of regional leaders 
attempting to negotiate peace in Sierra Leone) to be the “point 
president for peace” for the conflict of Sierra Leone.  The 
Prosecution attempted to point out flaws and inconsistencies in his 
testimony, including the following, which Taylor denied: 
 
a. That Taylor had lied about his involvement in the 1985 coup 
to overthrow the then Liberian president Samuel Doe; 
b. That Taylor lied about knowing rebel leader Foday Sankoh in 
Libya during the 1980s; 
c. That Taylor’s testimony regarding his decision to step down 
from the Liberian presidency was not based upon the Greystone 
attack, but rather from pressures by other West African leaders; 
d. That he supplied arms and ammunition to rebels in return for 
diamonds; 
e. That he helped rebels plan certain operations during which 
atrocities such as rape, murder, and amputation were committed; 
f. That he had knowledge of rebel commander Sam Bockarie’s 
public calls to kill Sierra Leoneans in Freetown if Foday Sankoh 
was not released from jail; 
g. That he participated in the operation of the attack in 
Freetown; 
h. That he sent fighters to destabilize the Ivory Coast; 
i. That he ordered the execution of Sam Bockarie because he 
knew that Bockarie had been indicted by the SCSL and he did 
not want Bockarie in the hands of the Court; 
j. That he systematically used child soldiers for combat;  
k. That he stashed away huge amounts of Liberian government 
money in foreign bank accounts; 
l. That the NPFL did not have standards to mitigate widespread 
abuses; 
m. That amputations occurred in Liberia as they did in Sierra 
Leone; and 
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n. That he was responsible for the execution of several Liberian 
politicians, including Jackson Doe, Gabriel Kpolleh, Moses 
Duopoe, and Samuel Dokie. 
ii) Prosecution Strategy Highlights 
a.  Questioning Taylor to demonstrate that he did not 
have complete control over the whereabouts of the 
documents of his personal presidential archives on which 
the Defense heavily relied during direct-examination. By 
questioning Taylor on the possibility that other 
individuals may have had access to the documents, the 
Prosecution attempted to show that the content of the 
documents could have been compromised. 
b.  Questioning Taylor to suggest that he had tried to 
benefit the RUF through his peace negotiations where the 
conclusion of the Lome Agreement would transform the 
RUF into a political party, affording the RUF all the 
rights of a party, including the right to assembly and 
amnesty covering crimes committed by the RUF. 
c.  Linking atrocities in Liberia by the NPFL soldiers to 
those in Sierra Leone by the RUF to demonstrate that 
Taylor was involved with the RUF. 
d.  Questioning Taylor on specific knowledge of alleged 
NPFL crimes, including alleged crimes of his own family 
members. 
e.  Questioning Taylor on his specific knowledge of the 
use of child soldiers, police brutality, and mistreatment of 
journalists, introducing media and articles including some 
from the BBC and Amnesty International that reported on 
the topics. 
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6. Miscellaneous Legal Issues 
i) Defense Request for Disclosure of Exculpatory Information on Witness 
Payments 
The Defense requested disclosure of exculpatory information 
about some $30,000 paid by the Prosecution to Defense Witness 
DCT-097 under Rule 68, arguing that this information tended to 
prove that Taylor was not connected with RUF diamond trading. 
According to the Defense, the Witness claimed that a Global Witness 
employee had interviewed him in 2001 regarding his involvement 
with the diamond trade and the RUF during the Sierra Leone 
conflict. Purportedly, the Prosecution gave the Witness an allowance 
during the period he was interviewed by the Prosecution; the 
Witness claimed that the Prosecution stopped giving him the money 
when they told him that he was not giving the Prosecution what it 
needed. The Trial Chamber granted this motion in part, ruling that 
the Prosecution must disclose information relating to payments made 
to DCT-097, but that the Prosecution was not obligated to disclose 
the alleged statement made by the Witness to the Global Witness.  
The Court noted that Rule 68(B) does not limit disclosure of 
exculpatory materials relating only to Prosecution witnesses, but is 
broader. The Court concluded that the Defense failed to make a 
prima facie case showing that the Global Witness statement existed, 
or that the alleged statement met the other elements of the test for 
mandated disclosure. Adopting the view of the ICTR in Karemera, 
the Court found that because the Prosecution did not contest the 
contents of the money transfers and because the funds were 
transferred by Prosecution employees, the Prosecution should have 
disclosed information about the transfers to the Defense. 
In a separate issue relating to witness payments and a 
subsequent charge of abuse of process made by the Defense against 
the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber ordered Prosecutors to disclose 
exculpatory evidence in their possession that suggests that Charles 
Taylor did not order the execution of Johnny Paul Koroma, the 
former leader of Sierra Leon’s military junta, the AFRC.  The factual 
issue of Koroma’s death is still at issue as the Defense argued that 
Koroma, who worked with the RUF rebels to bring down the 
government, may be alive.  
The Court’s order granted the Defense’s September 24, 2010, 
motion for disclosure, in which the Defense alleged that the witness 
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involved was previously a potential Prosecution witness who had 
received payments to cooperate with investigators and who later 
became a Defense witness. The Defense argued that the benefits 
given to the witnesses were meant to induce them to give false 
testimony against Taylor. The witness himself admitted to defense 
lawyers that he was making up the story to get money from the 
Prosecution. The witness was allegedly a subordinate who carried 
out the murder of Koroma, on order by Taylor as an individual who 
had knowledge of his dealings with Sierra Leonean rebel forces. 
The Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecution to disclose 
materials regarding an investigation by the Prosecution into the 
alleged death of Koroma, including DNA tests on corpses, records of 
disbursements made to Defense witness DCT-032, and an original 
duplicate copy of indemnity against the Prosecution before the 
Special Court. However, the Trial Chamber had at the time declined 
to draw adverse inferences from the Prosecution’s failure to comply 
with Rule 68(B), holding that since the potentially exculpatory 
material had not yet been disclosed, such a request was premature. 
After the exculpatory material was disclosed by the Prosecution, the 
Defense moved again for the Trial Chamber to draw an adverse 
inference from the disclosed material against the Prosecution 
allegations and evidence that Taylor was responsible in any way for 
the alleged death of Koroma in Liberia. 
The Trial Chamber dismissed this motion to draw adverse 
inferences against the Prosecution’s allegations and evidence that the 
Accused was responsible in any way for the alleged death of Koroma 
in light of the Prosecution’s failure to comply with Rule 68(B). The 
Court reasoned that the Defense failed to demonstrate that any 
material prejudice flowed from the Prosecution’s failure to comply 
with the Rule, that the failure to comply was not done in bad faith, 
and that the adverse inference sought is not available on the material 
relied upon, which does not go so far as to establish that the evidence 
of the Prosecution witnesses relating to Koroma’s death could not be 
believed. 
However, the Court granted the Defense’s motion for leave 
to appeal this dismissal, finding that the Defense met the conjunctive 
conditions of exceptional circumstances and irreparable prejudice 
that cannot be easily remedied in final appeal as prescribed by Rule 
73(b), which governs the test for granting an interlocutory appeal. A 
decision on the appeal has yet to be made. 
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The issue of the Prosecution’s payment to witnesses 
seemed to come up a couple of times in this case, both in 2009 
and 2010. While the issue in 2010 did not seem to be particularly 
controversial per se, has it become a theme in the Court's 
jurisprudence? 
ii) Defense Motion for Investigation of Prosecution for Abuse of 
Process/Contempt of Court 
In September 2010, the Defense first alleged abuse of process 
for the manner in which the Prosecution had conducted its 
investigations, and moved for relief in the form of an independent 
investigation into the OTP and its investigators under Rule 77.  The 
Defense cited an SCSL Appeals Chamber holding that the standard 
for an independent investigation into contempt is not of a prima facie 
case, which is the standard for committal for trial, but instead a 
different and lower standard of “reason to believe” that an offense 
may have been committed, a pre-condition for ordering an 
independent investigation. The Defense alleged that the Prosecutor 
was responsible for assaulting potential witnesses or suspects, 
exerting undue pressure by threats, harassment, and intimidation, and 
offering or providing improper payments, benefits, or other 
incentives. The Defense sought investigation into the conduct of the 
Prosecution in relation to witnesses and potential witnesses in this 
case as well as for payments and benefits offered and/or paid by the 
Prosecution to witnesses.  The Prosecution denied all allegations and 
sought to dismiss the motion on two counts: first, that it was filed 
untimely, and second, that it failed to establish that there is any 
credible reason to believe that any member of the Prosecution had 
been involved in conduct that would constitute “contempt of court,” 
arguing for a narrow construction of Rule 77.  The Defense replied 
by suggesting that the Special Court and ICTY Rules were 
distinguished on grounds that ICTY Rules were limited to three 
categories of witnesses whereas the Special Court deliberately 
included a fourth category not provided for in the ICTY Rules, 
namely, “potential witnesses.” The Court eventually orally dismissed 
this motion in October 2010, and gave its reasoning in a December 
2010 decision. 
Rule 77 sets out the law and procedure for dealing with 
contempt of the Special Court. The Appeals Chamber has stated that 
the standard of proof in determining whether an independent 
investigation should be ordered into a matter of contempt is not that 
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of a prima facie case, the standard for committal for trial, but a 
different and lower standard of “reason to believe” that the offense 
may have been committed. Notwithstanding the lower standard of 
proof, an allegation of contempt must still be credible enough to 
provide a Judge or Trial Chamber with “reason to believe” that a 
person may be in contempt. The Trial Chamber found against the 
Defense on the timing for bringing the alleged misconduct to the 
attention of the Trial Chamber, and under the ambit of Rule 77. 
Specifically, the Defense’s application amounted to a request for an 
audit of the Prosecution’s operations since the inception of the 
Special Court in 2002, which is a remedy too general and which does 
not fall within the ambit of Rule 77. Instead, Rule 77 is concerned 
about the conduct of individuals who have allegedly committed 
contempt and must be targeted at an individual engaging in specific 
conduct that the moving party must identify in greater detail and in 
accordance with the “reason to believe” standard. The Trial Chamber 
found no reason to believe that members of the Prosecution willfully 
interfered with the administration of justice or otherwise engaged in 
contemptuous conduct as identified in Rule 77 and so dismissed the 
Defense’s motion. 
However, the Court also granted the Defense’s motion for 
leave to appeal the previously denied motion for the investigation 
into contempt, finding that the Defense met the conjunctive 
conditions of exceptional circumstances and irreparable prejudice 
that cannot be easily remedied in final appeal as prescribed by Rule 
73(b), which governs the test for granting an interlocutory appeal. A 
decision on an appeal has yet to be made. 
Any comment on this direct assault by the Defense on the 
conduct of the Prosecution? 
V. EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF 
CAMBODIA (INTERNATIONAL DEPUTY CO-PROSECUTOR WILLIAM 
SMITH) 
TRIAL 001 
On July 26, 2010, the Trial Chamber issued its judgment in 
the case of Kaing Guek Eav Alias Duch (Case No. 001). On August 
16, 2010, the Co-Prosecutors filed an appeal against the judgment of 
the trial chamber convicting Duch of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and crimes against humanity. On August 24, 2010, Co-
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Lawyers for Duch filed an appeal of the Trial Chamber’s July 26, 
2010, judgment, asking the Supreme Court Chamber to set aside the 
Trial Court judgment and acquit Duch. 
 
Main Legal Issues from the Judgment 
1. Cumulative Convictions – Crimes Against Humanity 
This is the first of three grounds for the Prosecution’s appeal. 
Because Duch’s actions formed the basis for multiple convictions for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, the Chamber had to 
consider the effect of the cumulative convictions.  In doing so, the 
Chamber applied the Celebici test from the ICTY.  This test turns on 
whether the statutory provisions of multiple criminal convictions 
have materially distinct elements from each other. After applying 
this test, the Chamber found that extermination was found to 
encompass murder and the one instance of rape was included in 
torture. The Chamber also found that persecution on political 
grounds encompassed extermination, enslavement, imprisonment, 
torture, and other humane acts.  
In their Notice of Appeal, the Co-Prosecutors argued that the 
Chamber erred in subsuming all of these crimes against humanity in 
that of persecution on political grounds, and therefore erred in not 
convicting Duch cumulatively for all of the crimes against humanity.  
In subsuming the crimes, the Chamber based its judgment on the 
Kordi  Appeal Judgement, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Schomburg and Judge Güney on Cumulative Convictions, 
paragraphs 10 and 12 (noting that where persecution requires the 
materially distinct elements of a discriminatory act and a 
discriminatory intent, it is therefore more specific than murder or 
other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity, and further noting 
that convictions for imprisonment and persecution are impermissibly 
cumulative. Where persecution takes the form of imprisonment, the 
former subsumes the latter (citations omitted)). This is despite the 
fact that it seems that the majority of the judges in that Chamber 
entered cumulative convictions for persecution and other crimes 
against humanity.  
The Prosecution’s appeal further alleges that the Trial Court 
erred by characterizing the crime against humanity of rape as torture 
and not convicting Duch of the two distinct crimes (crime against 
humanity of rape and crime against humanity of torture) separately.  
The Chamber found Duch criminally liable for torture. However, the 
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Chamber noted that in 1975, “torture” required the involvement of a 
State official, and therefore this requirement was applied in Duch’s 
case.  Torture occurred in the interrogation techniques used in S-21 
and S-24, the rape of a detainee, and “other inhumane acts” inflicted 
on detainees.  The Chamber noted that rape is a separate offense 
from torture both under Article 5 of the ECCC Law and international 
criminal law.  However, the Chamber found that in this case, the act 
committed met the legal elements of both rape and torture.  
Did the Trial Chamber go too far in the way that it 
subsumed crimes within each other? Should it have instead 
entered cumulative convictions? What is the practical difference 
and effect between cumulative and subsumed convictions? 
2. Sentencing Issues/Court’s Discretion 
In sentencing Duch, the Chamber noted that there is not an 
international sentencing regime that applied to the ECCC.  With one 
dissenting judge, the majority stated that the sentencing would draw 
from international and Cambodian sentencing principles. Notably, 
one of the most prominent principles guiding the sentencing was that 
its purpose was to punish the accused, not to seek revenge. This is 
notable because of the outcry from civil parties and people in 
Cambodia and abroad who think the sentence is too light.  
What was the argument made by the dissenting judge on 
the sentencing principles? 
In the aftermath of the sentence, many commentators 
expressed doubt that the sentence was heavy enough to punish Duch 
and deter future war criminals. Drawing from the Rome Statute and 
Cambodian 2009 Penal Code, the Chamber announced that it would 
apply one single sentence for Duch’s multiple convictions. 
According to Deputy International Co-Prosecutor William Smith, the 
parole provisions under national law should not apply to Duch 
because he was convicted by an international tribunal.  Furthermore, 
Smith stated that there is no parole possibility under the ECCC 
because the ECCC expressly declined to include parole provisions 
that other internationals tribunals may have. 
How difficult was it for the Co-Prosecutors to agree on 
the factors for an appeal regarding the sentence issue?  What 
most influenced the decision to appeal on this issue? 
The Chamber refused to find that duress and following orders 
were mitigating factors. However, the Chamber did give “limited 
weight” to the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) government’s coercive 
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environment under which Duch operated as an officer of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK).  The Chamber also found 
Duch’s cooperation with the ECCC a mitigating factor because it 
aided “national reconciliation,” which was one of the goals of 
establishing the ECCC. Finally, Duch’s “propensity for 
reconciliation” was also given limited weight by the Chamber. 
Citing Duch’s failure to fully admit responsibility for his actions and 
his last-minute request for acquittal, the Chamber stated that any 
remorse that may have been a mitigating factor was undermined, 
diminishing the extent to which it may have been considered 
(although it apparently did not diminish it completely).  
Why should the Chamber have accorded any mitigating 
value to the DK government’s “coercive environment?”  Isn’t 
that a normal phenomenon in atrocity situations?  Didn’t Duch 
fatally undermine the mitigating advantage for cooperation 
when he sought “release” and “acquittal?” 
Duch’s sentence was further mitigated by his unlawful 
detention by the Cambodian Military Court for more than eight 
years.  Drawing reasoning from the ICTR, a majority of the Chamber 
found that Duch’s unlawful detainment entitled him to a reduction of 
five years from his sentence. Notably, the Chamber stated that 
“neither the gravity of the crimes . . . nor the constraints under which 
the Cambodian legal system was operating . . . can justify these 
breaches of the Accused’s rights.”  The majority sentenced Duch to 
35 years.  The 35 years was further reduced by the five-year 
compensation for Duch’s unlawful detention and for the time he 
spent in detention under the ECCC since July 31, 2007, thus 
reducing the sentence to be served to 19 years. 
Should we understand that there really was no 
disagreement by anyone—the Prosecution, Defense, Judges—
about the need to mitigate Duch’s sentence in light of the eight-
year detention in the Cambodian Military Court?  Does this 
mean that under no circumstances can the Appeals Chamber 
seriously consider a life sentence for Duch? 
The Prosecution’s appeal alleges that the Trial Court erred in 
its sentencing discretion by “giving insufficient weight to the gravity 
of the ‘crimes of a particularly shocking and heinous character’ 
committed by Duch, his role and willing participation in those 
crimes and, other aggravating circumstances; and giving undue 
weight to the mitigating circumstances.” The appeal also alleges that 
the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber is arbitrary and 
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inadequate and that the Trial Chamber “committed an error of law… 
by failing to consider the relevant international sentencing law and 
the range of sentences available to it in cases similar to this.” 
This is also the second ground for the Defense’s appeal that 
the Supreme Court acquit Duch, stating that the Court erred in the 
determination of a single prison sentence of 35 years. The appeal 
argues that Duch should be designated a witness to the events during 
the Democratic Kampuchea regime.  The appeal argues that the Trial 
Court violated Rule 87 of the ECCC internal rules by failing to 
examine the question of its personal jurisdiction, “solely on the 
grounds that the Defense preliminary objections were raised late.”  
How well does this sentence conform with the sentences 
meted out to others found guilty of similar crimes in other 
international criminal courts?  Explain how the issue of 
“gravity” figures so prominently in the Co-Prosecutors’ appeal 
and in the analysis of many commentators of the Trial Chamber 
judgment. 
3. Error in Defining Enslavement 
This is the third ground for the Prosecution’s appeal, which 
alleges that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to convict Duch of 
enslavement because it used an erroneous definition of the crime 
against humanity of enslavement.  The Chamber found that no fewer 
than 12,272 persons died at S-21 and S-24.  Due to the massive 
scale, the Chamber found that the deaths and executions of the 
detainees amounted to murder and extermination.  The Chamber also 
found that the detainees of S-21 were subjected to enslavement 
(which was meant in this case to be forced labor. . . “coupled with 
detention”), imprisonment, torture, other inhumane acts, and 
persecution on political grounds. With regard to enslavement, the 
Co-Prosecutors claim in their Notice of Appeal that the Chamber had 
relied on an incorrect definition of enslavement by making “forced 
labour an essential element of enslavement.”  
4. No Procedure to Allow a Guilty Plea 
The Trial Chamber noted that unlike other international 
tribunals, the ECCC does not allow a defendant to plead guilty.  As a 
result, the Chamber heard all issues related to the charges, even if the 
issues were not in dispute. Further, in only a few short paragraphs, 
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the Chamber rejected Duch’s defenses that he: 1) acted under duress 
and 2) was only following superior orders of the DK government. 
How should the Court handle a defendant who essentially 
pleads guilty, when there is no mechanism for a guilty plea in the 
rules of procedure and evidence? 
5. Lack of Jurisdiction over Cambodia Diminishes the Meaningful 
Participation of Civil Parties 
After convicting Duch of crimes against humanity of 
persecution and the above-listed war crimes under the Geneva 
Conventions, the Trial Chamber turned to whether Duch could be 
held responsible for the injuries of two categories of Civil Parties. 
The two categories of Civil Parties were survivors of S-21 and S-24, 
and relatives of detainees of S-21 and S-24. The Chamber found that 
66 Civil Parties had established their claim to be immediate victims 
of S-21 or S-24, or to have proved the existence of immediate 
victims of S-21 or S-24 and close kinship in relation to them. The 
death of these victims caused demonstrable injury and this harm was 
a direct consequence of Duch’s actions. The Trial Chamber granted 
the request of these Civil Parties that their names be included in the 
judgment. The Chamber rejected nearly all Civil Party reparation 
claims on the grounds of lacking specificity or as being beyond the 
scope of available reparations before the ECCC. The Trial Chamber 
did agree to order the compilation and publication of all statements 
of apology made by the Accused during the trial, but rejected that 
statements made by Civil Parties be included. 
In rejecting nearly all of the Civil Parties’ requests for 
reparations, the Trial Chamber recognized that, unlike regional 
human rights’ courts such as the European Court of Human Rights, 
the ECCC does not have jurisdiction to compel the Cambodian 
government or its national authorities to contribute monies to 
reparations.  
What will be the effect of the handling of Civil Parties in 
the Duch trial on future ICC cases?  What are the lessons to be 
learned, and what is the ECCC doing right, and wrong, in its 
dealings with Civil Parties in Trial 002? What's the point of 
being a Civil Party if all you get is your name published in the 
judgment, and the tribunal/court (whether it be the ECCC, or 
the ICC) has no real enforcement authority?  Could the Trial 
Chamber have determined more innovative remedies for the 
 
 A T R O C I T Y  C R I M E S  L I T I G A T I O N  Y E A R - I N - R E V I E W   [Vol. 9 284
Civil Parties, including some that had been suggested by lawyers 
for the Civil Parties during the Duch trial? 
6. The ECCC’s Personal Jurisdiction over Duch  
 This is the first ground for the Defense’s appeal asking the 
Supreme Court Chamber to set aside the Trial Court judgment 
against Duch and acquit him.   
 The Defense appeal argues that the Trial Court erred in 
finding that it had ratione personae jurisdiction over Duch.   
[The appeal alleges that the Trial Chamber] …failed 
to demonstrate why it was convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Prosecution evidence on 
which it relied proved that the Accused fell under its 
personal jurisdiction. In reality, in light of his official 
functions at the relevant time, the Accused does not 
fit into the category of persons under the jurisdiction 
of the ECCC. 
 The Defense appeal further argues that the Trial Chamber 
erred by applying international customary law inconsistent with the 
ECCC law.  
[It alleges that t]he Trial Chamber gave preference to 
common law principles at the detriment of the civil 
law principles recognized under the civil law system 
in effect in Cambodia. Such interpretation amounts to 
a violation of Article 2(1) of the Agreement between 
the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia concerning the prosecution under 
Cambodian law of crimes committed during the 
period of Democratic Kampuchea, of Articles 1 and 
2(new) of the ECCC law and of the civil law judicial 
system in effect in Cambodia. 
How can the Defense raise the issue of personal 
jurisdiction on appeal? 
Describe how the Trial Chamber addressed this issue 
long before closing arguments and the July 26, 2010, judgment, 
and arguably denied the Defense counsel the opportunity to raise 
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it so late in the proceedings and again on appeal.  Did Duch’s 
lawyers do themselves any favor with the judges by challenging 
personal jurisdiction in the manner in which they did? 
TRIAL 002 
7. Background 
On September 15, 2010, the Co-Investigating Judges issued 
the Closing Order that indicted four Khmer Rouge leaders: Nuon 
Chea, the party’s chief ideologue; Ieng Sary, the foreign minister; 
Ieng Thirith, the social affairs minister; and Khieu Samphan, the 
party’s head of state.  
The indictment charges that between April 17, 1975, and 
January 6, 1979, defendants, through their acts or omissions, 
committed (via a joint criminal enterprise), planned, instigated, 
ordered, or aided and abetted, or are responsible by virtue of superior 
responsibility, for the following crimes: 
(1) Crimes Against Humanity: (a) murder; (b) 
extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) 
imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecution on 
political, racial, and religious grounds; (i) other 
inhumane acts…(Closing order, p. 370). 
(2) Genocide, in killing members of Vietnamese and Cham 
groups. Defined as, "acts of killing, committed with the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group as such."  
(3) Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949: (a) willful killing; (b) torture or inhumane 
treatment; (c) willfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health; (d) willfully depriving a 
prisoner of war or civilian the rights of fair and regular 
trial; (e) unlawful deportation or unlawful confinement 
of a civilian. 
(4) Violations of the 1956 Penal Code of Cambodia: (a) 
homicide; (b) torture; and (c) religious persecution.
The Closing Order (p. 276) reads:  
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The Co-Investigating Judges find there is sufficient 
evidence that the Charged Persons, Nuon Chea, Ieng 
Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Ieng Thirith committed the 
crimes listed in this Closing order through their 
membership in the Joint Criminal Enterprise and their 
contribution to the common purpose…Further, the 
Charged Persons not only shared with the other 
members of the Joint Criminal Enterprise the intent 
that these crimes be committed as part of the common 
purpose, they were the driving force behind it. 
How do you assess the Closing Order? 
8. Continued Detention 
The Co-Investigating Judges decided in the Closing Order of 
September 15, 2010, to continue the detention for all four 
defendants, despite their advanced age and in some cases, failing 
health. Their reasoning for each: 
a. Ieng Sary: to ensure his presence at trial, to 
protect his security, and to preserve public 
order. 
b. Ieng Thirith: to ensure her presence at trial, 
preserve public order and avert the risk of 
Thirith exerting pressure on witnesses or 
victims. 
c. Khieu Sampham (Hem): to ensure the 
presence of Hem at trial, protect the security 
of Hem, preserve public order and avert the 
risk of Hem exerting pressure on witnesses or 
victims or destroying evidence if released. 
d. Nuon Chea: in order to ensure the presence of 
Chea at trial, protect his security, preserve 
public order and avert the risk of Chea 
exerting pressure on witnesses or victims or 
destroying evidence if released. 
Nuon Chea applied for provisional release because 
Cambodian Law does not allow provisional detention to exceed three 
years. His application was dismissed.  The Prosecution argued that 
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he should not be released in light of “the complexity of the case, the 
seriousness of the charges and the diligence of the Court to date.”  
The Co-Investigating Judges disagreed with the Defense’s 
interpretation of the applicable Cambodian law, and found that the 
Internal Rules do not limit provisional detention to three years and 
that it was necessary to maintain Nuon Chea (and the rest of the 
indicted) in Provisional Detention until they appear before the Trial 
Chamber, pursuant to Internal Rule 68. 
9. Appeals Against the Closing Order/Challenges to ECCC Jurisdiction 
Each of the accused filed an appeal in the Pre-Trial Chamber 
against the Closing Order, claiming that the Co-Investigating Judges 
erred by charging them with genocide, crimes against humanity, 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and with joint criminal 
enterprises as a mode of liability. They argued that these crimes and 
joint criminal enterprise were not part of the law applicable in 
Cambodia during 1975-1979—the relevant period of the court’s 
jurisdiction. Thus, they assert, the charges violate the principle of 
legality, which holds that a person can only be charged with crimes 
that were clearly established as such at the time of the alleged 
commission. 
  The argument is premised on the claim that 
the ECCC is a domestic court that must apply 
Cambodian law, and that domestic criminal law 
between 1974 and 1979 did not provide for the 
criminalization of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
or war crimes. Further, they argue that joint criminal 
enterprise was not a mode of liability recognized in 
Cambodia during the relevant time. Counsel for Ieng 
Sary also claims that a pardon, given to him in 1996 
by the King of Cambodia when he renounced his 
allegiance to Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, bars the 
claims against him, and that neither command 
responsibility nor aiding and abetting are appropriate 
modes of liability before the ECCC because they 
were not part of established Cambodian law by 1979. 
(Ieng Thirith Appeal from the Closing Order, page 
14).  
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On January 13, 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed and 
partially amended the indictments against Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, 
Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea. The Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the 
Accused Persons to be sent for trial and to continue to be held in 
provisional detention until they are brought before the Trial 
Chamber. The indictments continue to include charges of crimes 
against humanity, genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and murder, torture and religious persecution as defined 
by the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code.  The Pre-Trial Chamber found 
that the appeal filed by Khieu Samphan was inadmissible, whereas 
the appeals filed by Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Nuon Chea were 
found to be admissible in part. Of the admissible parts, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber dismissed all the grounds of appeal with two exceptions.  
First, the Pre-Trial Chamber ordered that the Closing Order be 
amended with a specification for the requirement of the existence of 
a link between the underlying acts of crimes against humanity and an 
armed conflict.  Second, the Pre-Trial Chamber also found that rape 
did not exist as a crime against humanity in its own right in the 
period 1975-1979, but that rape could be considered as “other 
inhumane acts” within the legal definition of crimes against 
humanity. The Closing Order was amended accordingly.   
Currently, the trial against the four leaders of the CPK is set 
to begin in mid-2011.  It is feasible that the Trial Chamber could 
hold its initial hearing within the first quarter of 2011 and set a date 
for opening the trial within the first half of 2011. 
What are the views of the OTP about the PTC decision of 
January 13, 2011, regarding the appeal?  Why did the PTC 
require a link between crimes against humanity and an armed 
conflict?  How will the finding on rape as an “other inhumane 
act” affect the Prosecution? 
10. Civil Party Participation and Reparations in the Wake of Trial 001 
The ECCC is the first hybrid court to provide a role for Civil 
Parties in criminal proceedings (recognizing that the ICC also 
provides for a role).  ECCC Internal Rule 23(1) provides that the 
purpose of Civil Party action is to (a) participate in criminal 
proceedings against those responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ECCC by supporting the Prosecution; and (b) 
allow victims to seek collective and moral reparations. 
The investigating judges received and reviewed 4,128 
applications from persons claiming to be victims of crimes 
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committed by the accused. They admitted 2,123 of the applicants as 
civil parties—victims recognized by the Court as parties to the 
proceedings who are allowed to claim collective and moral 
reparations. They rejected the remaining applications for a variety of 
reasons, most commonly because the applicant did not establish that 
his or her injury was related to a specific crime or crime-site 
included within the scope of the investigation.  
In Trial 002, the ECCC is under pressure to find more 
creative and symbolic solutions to the issue of reparations, should 
the accused be found guilty.  Deputy Prime Minister Sok An said,  
“People have to have something to take away and be proud of this 
court; to be proud of the trial…If the reparations after this second 
case are similar to the first case (Duch case), then most victims will 
not be satisfied. If the reparations are still the same, I think it will not 
be successful.”  
Considering the result in Trial 001, what meaningful 
“collective and moral reparations” can this court offer the 
victims who participate? 
The seventh plenary session of the ECCC took place between 
February 2 and 9, 2010, and resulted in amended Internal Rules 
creating two Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers to coordinate with all 
Civil Party Lawyers and victims. The amendments were adopted to 
streamline civil society participation and accommodate the large 
number of civil parties participating in Trial 002.  The Lead Co-
Lawyers will be responsible for overall advocacy, strategy, and in-
court presentation of the interests of all Civil Parties.  The new rule 
scheme “is intended to balance the rights of all parties, to safeguard 
the ability of the ECCC to achieve its mandate while maintaining 
Civil Party participation, and to enhance the quality of Civil Party 
representation.” 
A second set of amendments focused on reparations seeking 
to “open additional avenues through which reparations can be paid, 
such as third-party funds, to ensure that victims still receive 
reparations even if the convicted person is indigent or refuses to 
comply.” 
In August 2010, the Co-Investigating Judges began to release 
their first decisions on the admissibility of Civil Parties in Trial 002 
after a review of 3,988 applications.  Due to the large number of 
victims seeking to participate, the Internal Rules were amended to 
provide that decisions on the admissibility of such parties must be 
made during the judicial investigation and, at least, by the Closing 
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Order.  This was accomplished by September 15, 2010, when the 
Closing Order was issued. 
 If Trial 002 is set to begin in early to mid-2011, has this 
procedure provided the victims with enough opportunity to 
submit their applications to participate? What appeals process, 
if any, is there for victims who have submitted their appeal in a 
timely fashion and been denied? 
11. Political Interference 
On September 9, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ECCC 
issued the “Second Decision on Nuon Chea’s And Ieng Sary’s 
Appeal Against OCIJ Order on Requests to Summons Witnesses,” 
dismissing the request by lawyers for Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea for 
an investigation into alleged political interference by the Cambodian 
government in the Court.  The appeal was dismissed due to the 
failure to achieve the vote of a super-majority of judges. 
i) Procedural History 
Beginning in November 2008, Co-Lawyers for Nuon Chea 
and Ieng Sary filed several “Requests for Investigative Action” or 
“Rule 35 Requests,” asking that the Office of Co-Investigating 
Judges (OCIJ) interview current and former members of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia in hopes of finding “documents and 
information relevant to the pending judicial investigation . . . some 
of which may be exculpatory” in anticipation of Trial 002.  The 
lawyers for Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary filed the requests in response 
to public allegations of political interference, Hun Sen’s public 
remarks regarding potential ECCC witnesses, the RCG’s official 
position with respect to six summoned officials, and other events.  In 
response to the Requests, the OCIJ issued summonses and received 
no response.  The OCIJ refused to use coercive measures to compel 
appearances of the witnesses and dismissed the requests on January 
13, 2010.  On March 15 and 16, 2010, Co-Lawyers for Ieng Sary and 
Nuon Chea issued appeals to the Pre-Trial Chamber in response to 
the dismissal.  On June 8, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued its 
response directing the Co-Investigating Judges to “reconsider the 
Requests in light of the correct interpretation of Internal Rule 35,” 
but confirmed “the decision by the International Co-Investigating 
Judge [CIJ] that implementing coercive measures against the six 
summoned officials would unduly delay the conclusion of the 
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judicial investigation.” “The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the CIJs 
had incorrectly interpreted Internal Rule 35 which had led to an error 
of law.”  That is, the CIJs interpreted Rule 35 as having application 
only “once evidence can be deduced that the CIJs have failed to 
exercise their power or perform a particular function as a 
consequence of interference . . . ”  
In response, the CIJs filed the “Impugned Reconsideration” 
affirming their original decision. The CIJs reconsidered the request 
with the “purpose of ascertaining whether there might be any link 
between statements by members of the Cambodian government and 
the decision of witnesses not to appear,” and again found that the 
allegations did not warrant application of Rule 35. Finally, the Co-
Lawyers for Nuon Chea filed a response to the Impugned 
Reconsideration asking that the Pre-Trial Chamber “investigate 
whether comments made by Kong Sam, Khieu Kanharith, and others 
in the Royal Government of Cambodia may have impacted the 
ability or willingness of these witnesses summoned by the 
International Co-Investigating Judges to participate in interviews” 
and to take appropriate action, including instructing the OCIJ to 
carry out the investigative actions requested in the Rule 35 Request.  
ii) September 9, 2010, PTC Decision 
The Pre-Trial Chamber failed to reach a super majority 
decision on whether or not the Co-Investigating Judges erred in 
failing to conclude that material placed before them gave rise to a 
reason to believe that an interference pursuant to Internal Rule 35(1) 
may have occurred. 
Rule 35 provides that the ECCC “may sanction or refer to 
appropriate authorities, any person who knowingly and willfully 
interferes with the administration of justice,” including anyone who 
“threatens, intimidates…or otherwise interferes with a witness.”  
Rule 35 is “demonstrably” similar to Rule 77 of the ICTY.  The Pre-
Trial Chamber explicitly adopted that court’s approach to ICTY Rule 
77 in its application of ECCC Rule 35 here.  Unlike Rule 77 of the 
ICTY, however, Rule 35 provides that the accused must act with the 
mens rea elements of knowingly and willfully.  That is “it must be 
demonstrated that the accused acted willfully and knowingly and 
with the knowledge that his conduct was likely to deter or influence 
a witness or potential witness.”  
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iii) Joint Dissenting Opinion of International Judges Catherine Marchi-
Uhel and Rowan Downing  
The two international judges on the PTC filed a strong 
dissent arguing for intervention:  “As a result of the repeated failure 
of the CIJs to act, we are of the view that given the grave nature of 
the allegations of interference the Pre-Trial Chamber must 
intervene.”  They argued:  
In surveying this material [supporting the allegations 
of possible interference with the administration of 
justice] we are of the view that no reasonable trier of 
fact could have failed to consider that the [relevant] 
facts and their sequence constitute a reason to believe 
that one or more members of the [Royal Government 
of Cambodia] may have knowingly and willfully 
interfered with witnesses who may give evidence 
before the CIJs…The comment by [government 
spokesman] Khieu Kanharith [“that [the] 
government’s position was that [the six government 
officials] should not give testimony”] satisfies us that 
there is a reason to believe he, or those he speaks on 
behalf of, may have knowingly and willfully 
attempted to threaten or intimidate the Six Officials, 
or otherwise interfere with the decision of the Six 
Officials related to the invitation to be interviewed by 
the International Co-Investigating Judge. 
The two international judges argued that the “most suitable 
course of action would be to conduct further investigations to 
ascertain whether there are sufficient grounds to instigate 
proceedings.”  The judges based their decision on both the right to a 
fair trial and the need to uphold the integrity of judicial proceedings.  
[Though the international judges’ dissenting opinion 
did not prevail, it] is a healthy sign that the strong 
arguments advanced by those judges are being 
transparently demonstrated even though such 
arguments did not prevail at this stage of the 
proceedings. It is always possible that the Trial 
Chamber or even the Supreme Court Chamber in 
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Trial 002 will have an opportunity to revisit the issue 
and be persuaded by the dissenting judges’ views. 
(David Scheffer). 
iv) Majority Opinion of Cambodian Judges Prak Kimsan, Ney Thol, and 
Huot Vuthy 
The three Cambodian judges argued for dismissal of the 
appeal: “The statements of the spokesperson, Mr. Khieu Kanharith, 
cannot obstruct, prevent, or threaten directly or even indirectly the 
appearance of the six high-ranking officials before this Court.”  
Accordingly, they held that the Second Order by the CIJs reflects a 
“proper exercise of [the CIJs] discretion.”  
Isn’t there a back story to this entire saga regarding the 
six high-ranking officials and their refusal to testify?  What is 
the OTP’s view of the significance of these officials and the 
nature of the testimony that they might have delivered?  Are 
they truly individuals who would provide exculpatory evidence 
for the four Accused in Trial 002?  Or is this shadow-boxing by 
the Defense to delay, obstruct, and try to de-legitimize Trial 002?  
How seriously do you view political interference by the Hun Sen 
government in the work of the ECCC? 
v) October Statements by Hun Sen stating Case No. 002 would be the last  
In a meeting with United Nations Secretary Ban Ki-moon in 
October 27, 2010, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen said that he 
would not allow further prosecutions at the ECCC after Case 002.  
Hun Sen argued that further investigations would destabilize 
Cambodia.  The International Co-Investigating Judge, Marcel 
Lemonde, had proceeded with additional investigations while the 
Cambodia Judge, You Bunleng, did not support them. 
How does the OTP view allegations of political 
interference by the Hun Sen government in the work of the 
ECCC?  What is the reaction of other international tribunals to 
the potential interference by Hun Sen in determining whether or 
not there is a Trial 003, and whether or not his government staff 
will testify when called upon by the ECCC? If the world stays 
silent, doesn't this open up the door for other nations/leaders to 
stand in the way of atrocity crime investigations/trials with 
impunity? Is this already happening in Rwanda?  Didn’t 
Ambassador Rapp a few weeks ago visit Cambodia and not only 
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support the ECCC moving forward with further investigations, 
but also provide some assurance that the Cambodian 
government would not interfere? 
